

Recovery Under Fire: Security, Economic, Social and Environmental Dimensions of Ukraine's Chronic Polycrisis

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Abstract

The article examines the nature and specific features of Ukraine's chronic polycrisis, identifies the causal relationships among its security, economic, social, and environmental dimensions, and substantiates directions for transforming recovery policy based on resilience. The methodological framework combines systems analysis of secondary data, comparative analysis, and cross-verification of sources, enabling the polycrisis to be examined as a system of interconnected dimensions and facilitating the comparison of indicators derived from international databases and analytical reports. The empirical basis of the study includes data from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as the Global Peace Index, Fragile States Index, and WorldRiskIndex. The applied approach enabled the identification of structural interdependencies among individual dimensions of the crisis and the assessment of their impact on the formation of relevant public policies. The study finds that Ukraine's polycrisis is shaped by security, economic, social, and environmental factors that generate cascading effects and negative feedback loops. It is demonstrated that the security dimension serves as the system-forming trigger, generating economic losses, demographic

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transformations, and environmental risks. The article shows that traditional recovery policy instruments insufficiently account for the interactions among crisis processes, thereby necessitating a transition toward a model of strategic resilience governance based on the integration of security, economic, social, demographic, and environmental policies. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the conceptualization of chronic polycrisis as the environment within which recovery policy is formed and in the development of an approach that views recovery not as compensation for losses but as an instrument for building long-term state resilience. Conceptual foundations for the transformation of this policy are proposed on the basis of the European approach to polycrisis governance.

Keywords: polycrisis; public policy; national recovery plan; economy; security; demography; energy; ecology; Ukraine.

1. Introduction

Contemporary armed conflicts increasingly generate not isolated crises but systemic polycrises, in which security, economic, social, and environmental shocks overlap and mutually reinforce one another. Ukraine represents one of the most illustrative examples of such dynamics in global practice over recent decades. According to key international indicators, the country demonstrates simultaneous deterioration across all dimensions. In 2025, Ukraine ranked 162nd out of 163 countries in the Global Peace Index [6]; real GDP remained approximately 20% below its pre-war level according to the International Monetary Fund [8]; more than 6.9 million citizens resided abroad [16]; the budget deficit exceeded 20% of GDP; and reconstruction and recovery needs were estimated at USD 524 billion over the coming decade [20].

At the same time, the partial macroeconomic adaptation demonstrated by Ukraine since 2023 does not indicate an exit from the crisis. Rather, it takes place within a context of systemic instability that continues to accumulate long-term consequences.

For this reason, the study of chronic polycrisis in Ukraine is important not merely as an assessment of the current situation but, above all, as a scientific basis for the development of a recovery policy capable of operating under conditions of persistent multidimensional instability.

2. Review of basic research and publications in the chosen direction

The conceptualization of polycrisis as an analytical category is a relatively recent direction in economic and political science, although its individual dimensions – fiscal fragility, demographic shocks, energy vulnerability, institutional instability, and others – have long been examined independently in the literature. The starting point for understanding polycrisis as a systemic phenomenon can be found in studies devoted to cascading risks and interdependent shocks in fragile states, as well as in reports published by the OECD, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank concerning resilience and development under conditions of protracted conflict. In the Ukrainian context, scholarly debate unfolds at the intersection of several research traditions, including the economics of conflict and post-conflict recovery, theories of state fragility, macro-fiscal analysis, and studies of forced migration, which necessitates a synthetic approach to reviewing existing sources.

The concept of polycrisis as a systemic phenomenon involving the simultaneous overlap of multiple crisis dimensions has gained increasing attention in contemporary scholarship. OECD Economic Surveys: Ukraine 2025 [13] emphasizes the concurrent operation of military, energy, labour-market, and fiscal constraints that together shape Ukraine's unique polycrisis profile. This approach is consistent with the concept of polycrisis as a social phenomenon proposed by the French philosopher Edgar Morin in collaboration with Anne-Brigitte Kern in *Homeland Earth: A Manifesto for the New Millennium* (1999), as highlighted in the research of V.V. Smakota [14].

Belhaj notes that: «A polycrisis, as Morin described, arises from the interconnected nature of multiple crises – economic instability, environmental degradation, political conflicts, and social upheavals – which interact in ways that amplify their collective impact. These crises are not isolated but are part of a complex system, in which feedback loops and interdependencies create non-linear and unpredictable outcomes» [1].

Bystrov A. argues that: «Whereas a crisis was once understood as an event – a temporary disruption of a system's functionality – it has now become an environment, a permanent condition of existence. This condition can be described as a persistent polycrisis, in which numerous threats operate simultaneously and interactively» [2].

Regarding Ukraine, Volianiuk O. and Humeniuk I. maintain that under the conditions of full-scale war and the polycrisis of the contemporary world order, Ukraine requires a multidimensional approach in which, alongside the physical reconstruction of territories, new forms of self-organization, democratic integration, and cultural reinterpretation of local communities are developed [18].

Mark et al. emphasize that: «The increasing interconnectedness between different social systems, economic, technological, cultural, geopolitical, etc., across multiple regions, along with rising vulnerability and exposure to various sorts of stressors (social and biophysical) creates very high risk and can generate strong feedback loops where the outcome from one crisis or shock impacts and bolsters others, leaving almost no space for recovery before the next one hits» [11].

Earlier, Zeitlin J., Nicoli F., and Laffan B. [22] described various pathways for addressing the polycrisis within the European Union, including deeper integration, differentiated integration, the reconfiguration of multilevel governance mechanisms, and the strengthening of institutional capacity.

For Ukraine, which is experiencing a chronic polycrisis, such an approach is particularly relevant because it implies the integration of security, economic, social, demographic, and environmental policies into a unified system of strategic governance for national recovery and development.

The review of the scientific literature indicates that the problem of chronic polycrisis in Ukraine has been examined primarily in the context of individual crisis dimensions (security, economic, and demographic), while insufficient attention has been paid to its nature as a systemic phenomenon characterized by mutually reinforcing effects. Existing studies on crisis-response policies focus mainly on operational responses, whereas the need for integrated mechanisms of strategic governance for systemic instability remains underdeveloped. Particularly acute is the need to develop conceptual foundations for the transition from reactive responses to damage and disruption toward proactive strategic management of polycrisis that takes into account causal relationships among different crisis dimensions.

3. Highlighting previously unresolved issues and formulating research hypotheses.

The problem of chronic polycrisis in Ukraine lies in the fact that individual negative shocks do not operate in isolation; instead, a chain of causal relationships can be observed. War causes the destruction of energy systems and logistics networks; this increases inflationary pressure and worsens the fiscal balance; fiscal imbalances increase dependence on external financing; demographic problems weaken the labour market and future growth potential; and environmental damage undermines the productive base of agriculture, energy systems, and housing and communal infrastructure. Such a configuration corresponds to a polycrisis understood as a system of interdependent risks rather than a set of parallel problems.

In Ukraine's case, the «chronic» nature of the crisis is a fundamentally important characteristic. The OECD [13] emphasizes that recovery during an ongoing war is constrained by security uncertainty, labour shortages, energy deficits, and damage to businesses and infrastructure. Therefore, this is not a short-term shock but a prolonged developmental configuration in which even economic growth may occur within an environment of systemic instability.

4. Methodology and research methods

The study employs systems analysis of secondary data combined with comparative analysis and cross-verification of sources. Such an approach is determined by the nature of the phenomenon under investigation: polycrisis, as a system of interdependent crisis dimensions, requires the integrated comparison of heterogeneous indicators rather than the analysis of a single indicator. Sources were selected according to three criteria: international comparability, regularity of updates, and the ability to reflect interconnected dimensions of the crisis. The security dimension was assessed using the Global Peace Index and the Fragile States Index, whose combination makes it possible to distinguish between «negative peace» and «structural fragility». The macroeconomic dimension was examined through a comparison of data from OECD Economic Surveys: Ukraine 2025, IMF Country Reports 2025–2026, and the World Bank, with each source complementing the others. The demographic and social dimensions were analysed using data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Human Development Report 2025, enabling the combination of short-term humanitarian effects with long-term losses of human capital. The environmental dimension was examined using the WorldRiskReport and WorldRiskIndex, taking into account their own caveat regarding the systematic underestimation of Ukraine's actual environmental vulnerability under wartime conditions.

The applied methodology provides a multidimensional analysis of polycrisis based on verified international sources and enables a transition from describing individual crisis phenomena to identifying the structural interdependencies among them.

5. Formulation of the purpose of the article

The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of chronic polycrisis in Ukraine as a system of interdependent crisis dimensions (security, economic, social, and environmental), to identify the key causal relationships among them, and to substantiate priority directions for a recovery policy capable of ensuring a transition from situational responses to the strategic governance of systemic instability.

The study is based on the hypothesis that chronic polycrisis in Ukraine is not a collection of parallel shocks but rather a system of interdependencies among security, economic, social, and environmental dimensions. This systemic interconnectedness constitutes the principal reason why existing recovery policy instruments, designed to respond to isolated crises, are insufficient for ensuring sustainable recovery under conditions of ongoing instability.

6. Presentation of the main material with a full justification of the results

To develop a comprehensive understanding of chronic polycrisis in Ukraine, it is necessary to examine each of its dimensions separately and then identify the systemic interconnections among them. Such an approach makes it possible to demonstrate how the security, economic (macroeconomic, financial, and energy-related), social (including demographic), and environmental dimensions reinforce one another, forming a stable configuration of systemic instability.

Security Dimension. The security dimension is central because it activates most of the other crisis channels. According to the Global Peace Index 2025 [6], Ukraine ranks 162nd out of 163 countries, making it the second least peaceful country in the world after Russia. Trends over recent years indicate a systemic rather than accidental deterioration: Ukraine's score increased from 2.971 in 2022 to 3.043 in 2023, 3.280 in 2024, and 3.434 in 2025. This means that the security environment is not merely remaining poor but continues to deteriorate even after the economy has partially adapted to wartime conditions.

The Global Peace Index 2025 [6] records not only international conflict but also a deterioration in domestic security. The report notes that more than 291,000 cases of domestic violence were registered in Ukraine in 2024, representing a 20% increase compared with the previous year. Organized crime, illicit arms trafficking, and war-related forms of violence have also intensified. Thus, chronic polycrisis cannot be reduced solely to the frontline; it diffusely transforms the everyday structure of security within society.

The Fragile States Index confirms this conclusion from another perspective. The Fragile States Index 2023 Annual Report [5] indicates that Ukraine's score increased from 68.6 in 2022 to 95.9 in 2023, while its ranking jumped from 92nd to 18th among the world's most fragile states. Particularly significant is the fact that Ukraine received the highest possible scores in three of the dimensions most closely associated with polycrisis: External Intervention, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, and Security Apparatus. This suggests that the war has made state resilience increasingly costly, dependent on external support, and vulnerable to cascading disruptions.

Economic Dimension. Ukraine's economic profile is characterized by a combination of a severe shock, partial rebound, and subsequently constrained recovery under structural limitations. According to the OECD [13], real GDP grew by 3.4% in 2021, contracted by 28.8% in 2022, recovered by 5.5% in 2023, and expanded by 2.9% in 2024. Forecasts for 2025–2026 indicate growth rates of only 2.5% and 2.0%, respectively. According to the World Bank [20], Ukraine's GDP amounted to USD 190.74 billion in 2024, while GDP per capita reached USD 5,389.5. Thus, recovery is taking place, but it is not sufficient to return the country to its pre-war trajectory of prosperity.

These indicators are particularly important for identifying the characteristics of chronic polycrisis: positive annual growth does not necessarily signify recovery if the baseline level has been lost and the productive structure of the economy remains damaged.

Inflation dynamics are also typical of a polycrisis environment. According to the OECD [13], average annual inflation declined to 6.5% in 2024, but the forecast for 2025 increased again to 13.2%. Such inflationary waves are directly associated with attacks on energy infrastructure, production bottlenecks, and the fiscal burden of war.

Energy and Infrastructure Dimension. The energy and infrastructure dimension represents one of the most thoroughly documented material channels of polycrisis. The OECD [13] explicitly states that energy shortages and attacks on energy supply systems, logistics networks, and businesses constrain economic activity and contribute to inflationary pressures. Even under conditions of stable international support, recovery in 2025–2026 is expected to slow because infrastructure damage and energy shortages remain structural barriers to growth.

The Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4) [20] provides a quantitative picture of these constraints. As of the end of 2024, direct damage was estimated at USD 176 billion, while recovery and reconstruction needs amounted to USD 524 billion over a ten-year period. The sectors most severely affected were housing, transport, energy, trade and industry, and education. The assessment also reported that the number of damaged or destroyed energy facilities had increased by 70% compared with RDNA3, while a financing gap of USD 9.96 billion remained for priority recovery needs in 2025.

Institutional and Fiscal Dimension. The institutional and fiscal dimension of polycrisis is reflected primarily in the scale of wartime expenditures, persistent budget deficits, and dependence on external financing. According to the OECD [13], financing the war requires exceptionally large fiscal deficits, while defence expenditures account for approximately 25% of GDP. Budget deficits in 2025–2026 are projected to remain close to 20% of GDP, while public and publicly guaranteed debt is expected to approach 120% of GDP by 2026.

At the same time, the International Monetary Fund [7] warned in 2025 that progress in structural reforms remained uneven, particularly in the area of anti-corruption governance. The Executive Summary emphasized that several structural benchmarks scheduled for the second half of 2025 had not been achieved, while the weakening of anti-corruption enforcement institutions in July 2025 represented an additional negative signal. Thus, the institutional dimension of polycrisis is not limited to resource shortages; it also reflects the fact that prolonged emergency conditions complicate the implementation of reforms that are themselves necessary to overcome those conditions.

Social Dimension. The social dimension of polycrisis is manifested in the coexistence of rising nominal incomes, deteriorating access to services, persistent pressure on vulnerable groups, and the unequal distribution of adaptive capacities. According to the International Monetary Fund [7], following the collapse of the labour market in 2022, unemployment was projected to decline gradually from 24.5% in 2022 to 13.1% in 2024 and 11.6% in 2025. Real wages also partially recovered. However, this does not

alter the fact that living standards continue to be shaped by housing losses, displacement, service shortages, and severe fiscal constraints.

The OECD [13] emphasizes that support for low-income households has increased more slowly than inflation since 2021, while living conditions for many internally displaced persons remain extremely difficult. An additional indicator of social strain is the inclusion of persons with disabilities and veterans. Only one-third of persons with disabilities receive rehabilitation services, while in 2021 only 16% of registered persons with disabilities were employed. Therefore, social well-being in a polycrisis context cannot be reduced to average macroeconomic indicators. The decisive factor becomes access to recovery opportunities, rehabilitation, housing, and labour-market participation.

Human development indicators support this conclusion. According to the Human Development Report 2025 [15], Ukraine's Human Development Index (HDI) stands at 0.779, placing the country within the category of high human development. However, life expectancy, education, and income indicators remain difficult to sustain under wartime conditions and may require a prolonged period to recover even after the cessation of hostilities.

Demographic Dimension. The demographic dimension of polycrisis manifests itself through the combination of large-scale displacement, labour-force losses, limited return migration, and long-term pressure on human capital. According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [16], as of 25 December 2025, there were 3.712 million internally displaced persons in Ukraine.

The OECD [13] directly links displacement to labour shortages and the limited return of emigrants. The report emphasizes that active labour-market programmes remain insufficient. In this sense, demographic change is not merely a consequence of economic crisis but one of its active mechanisms: a reduced labour supply, lower workforce mobility, and a large proportion of people facing difficult life circumstances constrain economic growth, reduce the tax base, and weaken the social resilience of communities.

Environmental Dimension. The environmental dimension of polycrisis in Ukraine is often underestimated; however, it is precisely this dimension that determines the long-term productivity and viability of territories. The OECD [13] notes that the war has already resulted in the degradation of 30% of forests, contamination of soils and water resources, and large-scale damage to aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems following the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. At the same time, the collection of comprehensive information on environmental damage in many areas remains constrained by ongoing hostilities, meaning that even existing estimates are likely incomplete.


These challenges are compounded by climate vulnerability. Ukraine is highly sensitive to rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, droughts, floods, soil erosion, and thermal stress on energy systems. Much of the housing stock and infrastructure is poorly adapted both to energy-efficiency requirements and to climate extremes. Consequently, post-war reconstruction that does not incorporate climate adaptation risks reproducing existing vulnerabilities in a new form.

According to the WorldRiskReport [17], Ukraine is identified as one of the most vulnerable countries in Europe. Although the consequences of the war have not yet been fully reflected in the indicators of the WorldRiskIndex, the conflict has already significantly increased the vulnerability of Ukraine and neighbouring countries. This suggests that war-related environmental risks are likely to be systematically underestimated in international disaster-risk assessments.

Interconnections Among the Dimensions of Polycrisis. The analysis demonstrates that Ukraine has developed a chain of mutually reinforcing crises. Military insecurity undermines infrastructure and production; attacks on energy systems increase inflation and reduce output; these processes weaken the tax base while simultaneously increasing budgetary needs; large fiscal deficits contribute to debt burdens and dependence on international donors; population displacement and emigration weaken the labour market and reduce the potential for a return to higher growth rates; social pressures intensify the demand for public support; and environmental degradation diminishes the long-term productivity of territories while increasing future adaptation costs.

For this reason, Ukraine's polycrisis is not merely severe but also chronic. The statistical evidence reviewed in this study does not indicate a rapid return to pre-war conditions in any of the key dimensions. The Global Peace Index continues to deteriorate; the International Monetary Fund reports that real GDP remains below its pre-war level even in 2025; public debt and external financing remain critically important; reconstruction needs continue to expand; a substantial share of the population remains displaced; and environmental losses have only been partially assessed.

At the global level, the risk landscape presented by the World Economic Forum [21] helps explain why Ukraine's polycrisis also possesses an external dimension. In 2026, the Forum identified geoeconomic confrontation as the most significant short-term risk, followed by interstate armed conflict, disinformation, economic downturn, cyber risks, and institutional polarization. The report also emphasizes the strong interrelationship between inequality and economic decline. Ukraine represents a concentrated case in which these risks coexist simultaneously: a setting where geoeconomic competition, militarization, information warfare, infrastructure vulnerability, and debt sustainability converge within a single systemic configuration.



Source: World Bank data [19]

Fig. 1. GDP in Ukraine, 1991-2024 (Current US\$)

The dynamics of Ukraine's GDP reveal a pattern characteristic of chronic polycrisis: a sharp decline in 2022 followed by slower growth under conditions of ongoing military and infrastructure-related constraints. This evidence suggests that existing recovery policy instruments, designed primarily to address isolated crises, are insufficient to ensure sustainable recovery under conditions of prolonged instability. Although Ukraine has pursued a state recovery policy since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, the current configuration of polycrisis requires a more comprehensive approach. One of the key instruments of economic recovery has been state-supported preferential lending programmes for businesses, including the Affordable Loans 5-7-9% programme, which forms part of the broader Made in Ukraine policy, the National Development Institution, the eRobota programme, and other initiatives aimed at expanding opportunities for Ukrainian businesses [12].

At the strategic level, the Government of Ukraine has implemented measures designed to mitigate the adverse effects of the war on both businesses and households, supported by systematic financial assistance from international partners. These priorities are reflected in the Forecast of Economic and Social Development of Ukraine for 2025–2027 [9]. Structural instruments include reducing regulatory and administrative burdens on businesses, introducing new support mechanisms for small and medium-sized enterprises, rebuilding destroyed production facilities, constructing new productive capacities, and promoting full and productive employment, as envisaged in the Ukraine Recovery Plan [10]. In addition, the Verkhovna Rada has strengthened mechanisms for attracting private investment through public-private partnerships for Ukraine's reconstruction.

However, the analysis of causal relationships among the security, economic, social, and environmental dimensions of Ukraine's contemporary polycrisis demonstrates that recovery policy must be formulated in response to systemic polycrisis rather than isolated sectoral challenges. This conclusion is consistent with the European approach to polycrisis governance, which is based not on individual anti-crisis measures but on the combination of financial, regulatory, institutional, and territorial instruments aimed at strengthening the resilience of socio-economic systems and ensuring long-term recovery.

The principles outlined in the Strategic Foresight Report 2025 [4] are particularly relevant to the transformation of Ukraine's recovery policy:

- security is no longer a separate policy sector but a cross-cutting factor affecting all dimensions of national development, including economic performance, investment attractiveness, social cohesion, public well-being, and territorial development.
- recovery policy should be based not on reactive responses to crises but on the proactive development of resilience, including the capacity to anticipate risks, adapt to change, and undertake transformative action.
- climate change and environmental degradation should be viewed not merely as environmental issues but as determinants of economic, food, energy, and social security.
- demographic change, migration, human capital, and public health should be regarded as key components of long-term economic resilience.

These principles imply the need to build cross-sectoral solutions involving cooperation among the state, businesses, and civil society, where energy systems, logistics, public finances, social support mechanisms, and labour-market policies are planned and implemented in an integrated manner. At the same time, such an approach requires the transformation of public governance from a sectoral and reactive model toward an integrated resilience-governance framework. This transformation should include strengthening interagency coordination, introducing mechanisms for strategic foresight and risk assessment, institutionalizing crisis planning, incorporating security considerations into economic, social, and environmental policymaking, and establishing multilevel coordination mechanisms among central government authorities, regions, and territorial communities. Under these conditions, recovery policy should be directed not only toward compensating for losses but also toward strengthening the state's long-term resilience to future shocks and crises.

In particular, priority should be given to the development of a decentralized, protected, and climate-adapted energy system as a key condition for reducing macroeconomic vulnerability and ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the economy. Demographic policy should focus not only on encouraging population return but also on actively restoring labour potential through housing-support programmes, workforce retraining, the rehabilitation and integration of veterans, the development of care services, and measures designed to stimulate the economic participation of women and members of the Ukrainian diaspora.

At the same time, social policy should shift from predominantly compensatory mechanisms toward strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable population groups, particularly internally displaced persons, persons with disabilities, veterans, and households that have lost housing or sources of income. Equally important is the integration of the environmental dimension into all stages of post-war reconstruction through the combination of measures aimed at remediating contaminated territories, restoring natural ecosystems, improving energy efficiency, and adapting to climate change with infrastructure, housing, transport, and energy-development projects. Only such a comprehensive recovery model can ensure not the reproduction of pre-war vulnerabilities but rather the structural transformation and enhanced resilience of Ukraine under conditions of chronic polycrisis.

6. Conclusions and prospects for further research

The study made it possible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of chronic polycrisis in Ukraine as a system of interdependent security, economic, social, and environmental crisis processes and to identify the key causal relationships among them. The findings confirm the proposed hypothesis that chronic polycrisis in Ukraine is not a collection of separate crisis phenomena but rather a complex system of interconnected risks and negative feedback loops, within which deterioration in one dimension generates or intensifies crisis processes in other spheres.

It has been established that the security dimension functions as the primary trigger of polycrisis, generating cascading effects for the economic, social, and environmental systems. Military risks and infrastructure destruction reduce production capacity, create energy shortages, and intensify inflationary pressures, which in turn exacerbate fiscal imbalances and increase dependence on external financing. Demographic losses, forced migration, and the contraction of labour potential limit opportunities for economic growth and weaken community resilience, while environmental damage creates additional long-term risks for territorial productivity, food security, and future recovery. Taken together, these processes produce a persistent configuration of systemic instability that remains in place even under conditions of partial macroeconomic adaptation.

The study further demonstrates that under conditions of chronic polycrisis, economic recovery cannot be considered an independent area of public policy focused exclusively on restoring production, investment, or infrastructure. The effectiveness of recovery policy is determined by its ability to simultaneously account for security, demographic, social, and environmental constraints on development. This provides grounds for arguing that the object of public governance in a polycrisis environment should not be a specific sector of the economy or social life but rather the system of interconnected risks and vulnerabilities that shape the state's operating environment. Consequently, the strategic objective of Ukraine's recovery policy should not be a return to pre-war conditions, but the creation of a new development model based on the principles of resilience, adaptability, and transformative capacity.

The practical significance of the findings lies in substantiating the need to transition toward a cross-sectoral model of recovery governance, within which decisions concerning energy, demographic policy, labour markets, social protection, environmental restoration, and regional development are viewed as interdependent elements of a unified resilience system. Such an approach requires prioritizing decentralized energy systems, the restoration of human capital, support for the most vulnerable population groups, and the integration of environmental objectives into post-war reconstruction processes.

Prospects for further research are associated with the development of methodologies for the quantitative measurement of chronic polycrisis and for assessing the strength of interconnections among its security, economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Particular attention should be devoted to the development of resilience indicators for recovery policy, as well as scenario-based forecasting models capable of evaluating the influence of polycrisis processes on the implementation of Ukraine's reconstruction policy within the broader context of European integration.

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